Like wine, this book definitely got better with age! Lomperis grew up as a missionary kid in India and, like how most MKs grow up (this reviewer included), become prescient long-range thinkers, groomed by years of thinking multi-culturally, in multiple languages, and knowing multiple theories of what constitutes rebellion and change in non-democratic societies. Using that type of upbringing, Lomperis asks his readers to understand two significant ideas. First, what are the ingredients of a successful insurgency (and, conversely, of a successful counterinsurgency) and second, what is the optimal level of a Western intervention in either thwarting (or aiding) an insurgency?
These two conceivably simple questions form both an empirical question and a policy question in which the United States currently finds itself, again, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lomperis' non-lessons about Vietnam now ring true when overlaid onto our current situation. The empirical question has been answered: Can nations involved in an insurgency conduct free, fair and competitive elections? Obviously the answer is "yes," since it was so admirably demonstrated in both war-torn nations. Elections are the key non-lesson learned from Vietnam since they were never accomplished correctly, fairly, freely or even competitively. Lomperis states, then proves conclusively, that elections are the "true Achilles heel" of the insurgent's strategy to destroy popularly-elected government.
As for the concept of involvement, Lomperis demonstrates that once a legitimate government has been empowered, the building of respect for it must be undertaken. From a policy viewpoint, our intervention/involvement with a nation struggling to overcome a fully enveloped insurgency must be a threefold arrangement.
First, Lomperis argues that society's fundamental "constitutional" arrangements and historical traditions must be upheld; second, by being itself duly constituted by these arrangements and performing the group functions prescribed for it; and, finally, by being acceptably competent in the discharge of its duties and policies. An insurgency, which is a challenge to constituted authority, will attempt to undermine the police forces first and foremost because they are the most conspicuous targets. However, the more legitimate the government and the more corrosion that can be placed on the insurgent forces, the sooner the insurgency will be broken and stability returned. The summary of this concept is policy in action: belief, opportunity, interest.
To bring about the change of government from turmoil due to insurgency and into a sphere of stability, Chapter 11 is the most interesting and useful because it demonstrates how to create a timeline for an exit strategy. Using lessons from six case studies: Mao's long march in China from 1920-1949, Greece 1941-1949, the Philippines 19461956, Malaya 1948-1960, Cambodia-Laos 1949-1975, and Sendero Luminoso's Peru 1970-1992, Lomperis benchmarks insurgent successes and defeats in a smartly laid out timeline that identifies factors important to legitimate governments. He then plots categories and possible futures which are laid out for policy analysts to mull over. Lomperis' work shows that after legitimate national elections, victory will take approximately five years to achieve, if all involved will stay the course.
This book is an important addition to the body of knowledge regarding insurgency in nations that have undergone Western interventions. While the author may have struggled to make sense of the Vietnam War and couldn't, he definitely makes sense of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would behoove those who quantify and codify "lessons learned" for special warfare instructional purposes to read this book, again, and develop the wherewithal and policies to ensure that Iraq and Afghanistan survive and prosper and that our exit from those nations be seen as a victory over those who believe in anarchy.
